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Summary
We propose a neurocomputational model of altruistic choice and test it using behavioral and fMRI 
data from a task in which subjects make choices between real monetary prizes for themselves and 
another. We show that a multi-attribute drift-diffusion model, in which choice results from 
accumulation of a relative value signal that linearly weights payoffs for self and other, captures 
key patterns of choice, reaction time, and neural response in ventral striatum, temporoparietal 
junction, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. The model generates several novel insights into the 
nature of altruism. It explains when and why generous choices are slower or faster than selfish 
choices, and why they produce greater response in TPJ and vmPFC, without invoking competition 
between automatic and deliberative processes or reward value for generosity. It also predicts that 
when one’s own payoffs are valued more than others’, some generous acts may reflect mistakes 
rather than genuinely pro-social preferences.
Altruism involves helping others at a cost to the self, not only when such behavior is 
supported by strategic considerations like reciprocity or cooperation (Dufwenberg and 
Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998), but even in the 
absence of expectation for future benefit (e.g. fully anonymous, one-time generosity: Batson, 
2011; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). A major goal of neuroeconomics is to develop 
neurocomputational models of altruistic choice, specifying which variables are computed, 
how they interact to make a decision, and how are they implemented by different brain 
circuits. Such models have proven useful in domains such as perceptual decision-making 
(Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Heekeren et al., 2008), simple economic choice (Basten et al., 
2010; Hunt et al., 2012; Rangel and Clithero, 2013), self-control (Hare et al., 2009; Kable 
and Glimcher, 2007; Peters and Büchel, 2011; van den Bos and McClure, 2013), and social 
learning (Behrens et al., 2008; Boorman et al., 2013). We propose a neurocomputational 
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model of simple altruistic choice and test it using behavioral and fMRI data from a modified 
Dictator Game in which subjects make choices between pairs of real monetary prizes for 
themselves ($Self) and another ($Other). These choices involve a trade-off between what is 
best for the self and what is best for the other, and thus require people to choose to act 
selfishly or generously.
Our model assumes that choices are made by assigning an overall value to each option, 
computed as the weighted linear sum of two specific attributes: monetary prizes for self and 
other. This type of simple value calculation captures a wide range of behavioral patterns in 
altruistic choice (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Engel, 2011; Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). Our model also assumes that the 
overall value signal is computed with noise and that choices are made using a multi-attribute 
version of the Drift-Diffusion Model (DDM: Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008; Smith and 
Ratcliff, 2004). In this algorithm, a noisy relative value signal is integrated at each moment 
in time and a choice is made when sufficient evidence has accumulated in favor of one of the 
options. This type of algorithm has been shown to provide accurate descriptions of both 
choice and reaction time (RT) data (Busemeyer and Townsend, 1993; Hunt et al., 2012; 
Krajbich et al., 2010; Milosavljevic et al., 2010; Rodriguez et al., 2014; Smith and Ratcliff, 
2004), as well as neural response patterns associated with computing and comparing values 
(Basten et al., 2010; Hare et al., 2011; Hunt et al., 2012) in many non-social domains.
The model suggests neural implementation of two specific quantities. First, values for the 
attributes $Self and $Other must be computed independently. Second, an overall value signal 
must be constructed from the independent attributes. We hypothesized that areas like the 
temporoparietal junction, precuneus, or medial prefrontal cortex may compute quantities 
related to the value of these attributes. Prior research strongly implicates these regions in 
social behavior (Bruneau et al., 2012; Carter and Huettel, 2013; De Vignemont and Singer, 
2006; Decety and Jackson, 2006; Hare et al., 2010; Jackson et al., 2005; Moll et al., 2006; 
Saxe and Powell, 2006; Singer, 2006; Waytz et al., 2012; Zaki and Mitchell, 2011), although 
their precise computational roles remain poorly understood. Inspired by a large body of 
work on the neuroeconomics of non-social choice (Basten et al., 2010; Hare et al., 2009; 
Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Lim et al., 2013; McClure et al., 2004; Tom et al., 2007), we 
additionally hypothesized that the integration of specific attribute signals would occur in 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). We explore these hypotheses with our fMRI 
dataset.
We also highlight three ways in which the development of a computational model of 
altruistic choice can be used to generate novel insights into the nature of altruistic choice. 
First, we compare the model’s predictions about RT and neural response for generous versus 
selfish choices. We find that, for the best-fitting parameters, the model predicts longer RT 
and higher BOLD response in decision-related regions for generous choices, and that the 
predicted effect sizes match the observed data. Second, we use simulations to identify how 
model parameters influence altruistic behavior, and find that several of these variables 
(including the relative importance of benefits to self and other and the decision boundaries 
of the DDM) predict observed individual differences in generosity. Third, we show that the 
model predicts that generous decisions are sometimes unintended mistakes resulting from 
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the noisy choice process, and exploit an aspect of our experimental design to test this using 
fMRI data.
 Results
We collected whole-brain BOLD responses in male subjects while they made 180 real 
decisions about different allocations of money between themselves and a real-but-
anonymous partner. Each trial consisted of a choice phase and an outcome phase (Figure 
1A). During the choice phase, the subject saw a proposal consisting of monetary prizes for 
himself ($Self) and for another person ($Other), and had to decide whether to accept or 
reject it in favor of a constant default prize of $50 for each. On each trial the subject saw one 
of the nine proposal types depicted in Figures 1B and 2C–D, with ±$1–$4 random jitter 
added to avoid habituation. All proposals included one payment below and one payment 
above the default, creating a choice between generous behavior (benefitting the other at a 
cost to oneself) and selfish behavior (benefitting oneself at a cost to another). Subjects 
indicated their decision using a four-point scale (1=Strong No, 2=No, 3=Yes, 4=Strong Yes), 
allowing us to measure both the choice and the value assigned to the proposal. Right-left 
orientation of the scale varied randomly from scan to scan to reduce motor-related 
confounds in neural response. Every decision was followed by an outcome phase, during 
which the decision made by the subject was implemented with 60% probability and reversed 
with 40% probability. Subjects were told about the 40% probability of choice reversal, and 
that their partner knew their choices might be reversed, but were encouraged to simply 
choose the option they most preferred, since their choice made it more likely to occur (see 
Supplementary Materials for instructions). At the end of the experiment one trial was 
randomly selected and its outcome implemented. As shown below, the reversal mechanism 
allows us to test the extent to which different choices may be decision mistakes, while not 
changing incentives to pick the best option.
 Average choices are relatively selfish
Subjects made generous choices—maximizing their partner’s payoff ($Other) at a cost to 
their own ($Self)—in 21% ±18 (mean ± SD) of trials, sacrificing $3.73 ± 4.64 per trial and 
giving $8.31 ± 6.86. This level of giving is comparable to other studies of anonymous 
altruism (Engel, 2011), but also suggests that subjects in general behaved relatively selfishly. 
There was considerable individual variation in generosity, ranging from 0%–61% generous 
choices and $0-$22.37 given to the partner. This variation is useful for exploring individual 
differences, as we do below.
 Computational model
The model is a multi-attribute extension of the standard DDM (Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008; 
Smith and Ratcliff, 2004). On every trial the choice is based on a dynamically evolving 
stochastic relative decision value (RDV) signal that provides an estimate of the desirability 
of the proposed prize ($Self, $Other) relative to the default prize ($50, $50). The signal 
starts at zero, remaining there for an amount of non-decision time capturing processing and 
motor delays, given by the parameter NDT. Afterwards, it accumulates stochastically at time 
t according to the difference equation
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where $Self and $Other are the proposed prizes for self and other, wself and wother are 
constant weights, and εt denotes white Gaussian noise that is identically and independently 
distributed with standard deviation σ. A choice is made the first time the RDV crosses one of 
two pre-specified barriers. The proposal is accepted if the positive barrier is crossed first and 
rejected if the negative barrier is crossed first. RT equals the sum of the NDT and crossing 
time t. Building on previous work with time-limited decisions (Churchland et al., 2008; 
Cisek et al., 2009; Milosavljevic et al., 2010), we allow for the possibility of collapsing 
barriers, although the model includes fixed barriers as a special case. The upper barrier is 
described by the equation
where b > 0 is a parameter denoting the initial height of the barrier, d ≥ 0 is a parameter 
denoting its exponential rate of decay, and t is measured from the end of the non-decision 
period. The lower barrier is symmetric, so that Bt= −B̄t. Without loss of generality, we 
assume that σ = 0.1, since the model is invariant to affine transformations of the parameters 
(Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008). The model has five free parameters: NDT, wself, wother, b and 
d.
Figure 1C illustrates the model. The relative value of the proposal is given by V = wself 
($self – $50) + wother ($Other – $50). When V is positive the optimal choice is to accept the 
proposal and otherwise to reject it. The decision problem is complicated if V is measured 
with noise at every instant during the decision phase, especially if the amount of noise is 
high. The DDM algorithm provides an elegant solution to this problem: by dynamically 
integrating the instantaneous noisy value measures, RDV generates a posterior estimate of 
the log-likelihood ratio that the optimal choice is to accept (Bogacz et al., 2006; Gold and 
Shadlen, 2002). The barriers define a rule for how large this posterior estimate has to 
become to make a decision. The barriers collapse over time to allow choices to occur in a 
reasonable timeframe even for trials with low RDV where the signal moves away from zero 
very slowly.
Several aspects of the model are worth highlighting. First, although choices and RTs are 
inherently stochastic, the model makes quantitative predictions about how different 
parameters and proposal amounts affect their distribution. Second, the size of the weights 
wself and wother, as well as the barrier location, affects the quality and speed of choices, a 
phenomenon known as the speed-accuracy tradeoff (Bogacz et al., 2010). This implies that 
mistakes are possible: individuals sometimes act selfishly or altruistically despite their 
underlying preferences. When the barriers are initially high and decay slowly (b large and d 
small), decisions are slower but made more accurately. Finally, the relationship of wself to 
wother plays a critical role. If wself = wother, the model predicts that $Self and $Other 
influence choices, RTs, and errors symmetrically. In contrast, if wself> wother, changes in 
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$Self have a stronger impact on choices and RTs, and errors are distributed asymmetrically, 
such that they more frequently involve excessive generosity (more on this below).
 The model accurately predicts out-of-sample choice and RT
We used a maximum likelihood method based on simulated likelihood functions to estimate 
the best-fitting parameters of the model in a randomly-selected half of the data. We used 
these parameters to test the fit between model predictions and observed data on the other 
half, separately for each subject (see Methods for details). Model predictions capture inter-
individual differences in mean donations (mean Pearson’s r49= .94, P < .0001) and RTs (r49 
= .96, P < .0001) quite well (Figure 2A, B). The model also captures intra-individual 
differences in acceptance rates (mean r = .88, one-sample t50 = 45.05, P < .0001; Figure 2C) 
and in RTs (mean r = .53, one-sample t50 = 11.79, P < .0001; Figure 2D) across different 
trial types.
Although this suggests that the model described above fits well, Figure 2C indicates that the 
fit for choice behavior (though not RT) was poorer when the proposal involved a sacrifice 
for the subject (i.e., $Self amounts below the default). To investigate this issue, we fit a 
variant of the model that allows the parameters to depend on whether $Self is more or less 
than $Other. This alternative model is motivated by previous behavioral work showing that 
the value placed on $Self and $Other can depend on whether the self is coming out ahead or 
behind (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). 
As detailed in the Supplemental Materials, this analysis improves the fit to observed choice 
behavior when $Self < $Other, an effect that derives from a higher weight wself, a lower 
weight wother, and a higher threshold parameter. However, because there are no qualitative 
differences in the analyses reported below when using the more complex model, for 
simplicity the rest of the analyses utilize the simpler version.
 Estimated model parameters in the full dataset
Having demonstrated that the model accurately predicts out-of-sample choices and RTs, we 
next examine the best-fitting parameter values using the full dataset (see Table 1). Several 
results are worth highlighting. First, the average NDT (868ms) is larger than that usually 
found for DDMs (Milosavljevic et al., 2010; Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008). We attribute this 
to the additional time subjects may have needed to determine the payoffs on each trial and 
translate that into a graded response. Second, both wself and wother are significantly larger 
than zero on average (both P < .003) and wself is considerably larger than wother (paired-t50 = 
10.83, P < .001) Third, we find substantial individual variation in the best-fitting values for 
all five parameters, which is useful for the individual difference analyses described below.
 vmPFC responses encode an integrated value signal at decision
The model suggests that an integrated value signal is used to make choices. We provide 
neural evidence of such a signal by estimating a general linear model to identify regions in 
which BOLD responses correlate positively with the value assigned to proposals at the time 
of decision, measured by the four-point response scale (1 = Strong-No to 4 = Strong-Yes). 
Several regions satisfy this property, including a region of vmPFC (P < .05, whole-brain 
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corrected [WBC]; Figure 3A; Table S3) that encodes stimulus values at the time of decision 
in a wide range of tasks (Clithero and Rangel, 2013; Kable and Glimcher, 2007).
 Neural representations of $Self and $Other
Our model assumes that the overall value assigned to the proposal (and used by the DDM 
comparator algorithm to generate a choice) is constructed from information about the 
independent attributes $Self and $Other. We show that there are neural signals consistent 
with representation of these two quantities, using a second model to look for areas in which 
BOLD responses correlate positively with either $Self or $Other separately (i.e., inputs to 
the integrated value signal), as well as regions that reflect both (i.e., overall values).
$Self correlates with BOLD responses in a distributed set of regions (Figure 3B, Table S4), 
including vmPFC (P < .05, WBC) and the ventral striatum (P < .05, WBC). $Other 
correlates with BOLD responses in a distinct and more circumscribed set of regions (Figure 
3C, Table S4), including right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ), precuneus (both P < .05, 
WBC), and vmPFC (P = .004 SVC). To determine the specificity of these responses, we 
looked for regions in which the effect for $Self is stronger than for $Other, and vice versa. 
Regions responding more strongly to $Self include the ventral striatum (P < .05, SVC), 
vmPFC, and areas of visual and somatosensory cortex (P < .05, WBC). No regions respond 
more strongly to $Other at our omnibus threshold, although we observe such specificity in 
the right TPJ at a more liberal threshold (P < .005, uncorrected). A conjunction analysis 
(Table S4) shows a region of vmPFC (Figure 3D) responding significantly to both $Self and 
$Other (P < .05, SVC). This area also overlaps fully the vmPFC area correlating with overall 
preference, supporting the idea that it may represent an area where separate attributes are 
combined into an integrated value signal.
Together, the behavioral and neural results are consistent with the hypothesis that both $Self 
and $Other, quantities required by the computational model, are independently represented 
in the brain. The results also support the idea that the vmPFC combines information about 
$Self and $Other into an overall value, and that choices are made by integrating the proposal 
values using an algorithm that is well captured by the DDM. These results motivate the 
second part of the paper, in which we use the best-fitting computational model to derive and 
test several implications of the theory.
 Implication 1: RTs are longer for generous choices, particularly for more selfish 
individuals
Our computational model has the advantage that it provides a theory of the relationship 
between choices and RTs. This is of particular interest because differences in RT when 
choosing to act selfishly or generously have been used in several studies to make inferences 
about the relative automaticity of pro-social behavior (Piovesan and Wengstrom, 2009; Rand 
et al., 2012). Simulations from the individual models reveal two interesting predictions. 
First, in the domain of best-fitting parameters for our subjects, the model predicts that on 
average RTs are longer for trials that result in a generous (G) choice compared to trials 
resulting in a selfish (S) choice (predicted RTG = 2,269, predicted RTS = 2,074, paired-t50 = 
9.37, P < .0001; Figure 4A). Second, it predicts that this RT difference is bigger for more 
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selfish subjects (correlation between predicted generosity and difference in G vs. S RTs r49 = 
−.89, P < .0001; Figure 4B). The observed data displayed both patterns. On average, G 
choices were significantly slower than S choices (RTG = 2,300 ms ± 310, RTS = 2,131 ms 
± 280, paired t43 = 4.97, P < 0.0001; Figure 4C), and the more generous the individual, the 
smaller this difference (r42 = −.60, P < .001, Fig. 4D).
 Implication 2: Neural response in valuation and comparison regions is higher for 
generous choices
Our computational model suggests a neural corollary of differences in RT: regions whose 
activity scales with computation in the comparison process should have higher responses 
during G compared to S choices (predicted comparator response, arbitrary units: CompG = 
69.68 ± 27.97, S choice = 65.76 ± 27.62, paired-t50 = 6.43, P < .0001, see Methods for 
details). To see why, note that the predicted area-under-the-curve of the accumulator process 
is larger on longer trials, and that inputs into this process must also be sustained until the 
process terminates at a decision barrier. This prediction is important, since many studies of 
altruism have observed differential response during pro-social choices in regions like the 
vmPFC and TPJ and interpreted it as evidence that such choices are rewarding (Zaki and 
Mitchell, 2011), or that they require the inhibition of selfish impulses by the TPJ (Strombach 
et al., 2015). In contrast, our model suggests that such differences could be a straightforward 
by-product of the integration and comparison process.
To test this prediction, we first defined two independent ROIs shown in previous research to 
have differential response during G choices: 1) a value-modulated vmPFC region (Figure 
5A) based on the set of voxels that correlated significantly with stated preference at the time 
of choice (P < .0001, uncorrected); and 2) a generosity-related TPJ region (Figure 5B) based 
on an 8-mm sphere around the peak coordinates of a recent study reporting greater activation 
in the TPJ when subjects chose generously (Strombach et al., 2015). In both regions, we 
replicate the pattern of higher response on G vs. S choices (both P < .02). Critically, 
however, we also find that differential BOLD on G vs. S choices correlates positively with 
predicted differences in accumulator response in both regions (both r42 > .46, P < .001). 
Moreover, accounting for predicted accumulator differences reduces to non-significance the 
differential generosity-related response in both vmPFC (P = .92) and TPJ (P = .91). In 
contrast, response in occipital and motor cortices (which show value modulation but are 
unlikely to perform value integration and comparison) bear little resemblance to predictions 
of the model (Figure S2).
 Implication 3: Relationships between model parameters and generosity
In order to understand the impact on generosity of variation in the different parameters, we 
simulate model predictions for our task for a wide range of parameter combinations (see 
Methods for details). For each parameter combination, we calculate the average generosity 
(i.e., the average amount of money given to the other over all trials by choosing generously). 
Then, we use multiple regression to measure the independent influence of the five model 
parameters on variation in average simulated generosity. In the regression, all parameters are 
normalized by their mean and standard deviation in order to assess their influence on a 
common scale. As illustrated in Figure 6A–B, we find the expected association between 
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average generosity and both wSelf (β= −4.86, P < .0001) and wOther (β = 9.26, P < .0001). 
Intriguingly, the simulations also reveal that a lower starting threshold (β = −.141, P = .
0001), and a faster collapse rate (β = .21, P < .0001) increase generosity. That is, individuals 
with less stringent barriers tend, under the model, to make more G choices, holding wSelf 
and wOther constant. Based on the results below, we attribute this shift to an increase in 
choice errors for individuals with less stringent decision-criteria, leading to less accurate 
(and in this case, generosity prone) behavior. The model predicts no relationship with NDTs 
(P = .79).
We use a similar regression to see if the same relation is evident in the observed data. As 
with the simulated data, the fitted parameters were z-scored to assess their influence on a 
common scale. Consistent with model predictions, we find that average observed generosity 
correlates negatively with wSelf (β = −3.11 ± .28, P < .0001) and positively with wOther (β = 
6.47 ± .29, P < .0001). Also as predicted, observed generosity correlates negatively with the 
height of the decision threshold (β = −1.51 ± .41, P = .0006) and positively with the rate at 
which the threshold collapses toward zero (β = 1.08 ± .37, P = .006). The NDT parameter is 
non-significant, as expected.
 Implication 4: Errors are more likely to involve generous choices
Because choices are stochastic, the model suggests that some may be errors (i.e., a decision 
in which the option with the higher relative value is not chosen: Bernheim and Rangel, 
2005). We use the simulated data to investigate how decision mistakes change with variation 
in the model parameters, and how this affects generosity. Multivariate regression analyses on 
the theoretical data, where mistakes can be identified precisely on every trial, show that error 
rates decrease with wSelf (β = −.05, P < .0001) and wOther (β = −.014, P < .0001), and 
increase with more liberal barrier parameters for b (β = −.04, P < .0001) and d (β =.05, P < .
0001). We also assess the relationship between model parameters and the relative percentage 
of trials that result in generous errors (mistakenly choosing to give to the other) vs. selfish 
errors (mistakenly choosing to keep more money). This assesses whether different 
parameters increase generosity by increasing errors. As shown in Figure 6C, wSelf (β = .026, 
P < .0001) and wOther (β = −.047, P < .0001) influence the relative balance toward generous 
errors in opposite ways. Increasing the height of the barrier decreases the bias toward 
generous errors (b: β = −.008, P < .0001; d: β = +.01, P < .0001; Figure 6D), while NDT has 
no effect (β = −.0001, P = .89).
We next use the individually-fitted weights wSelf and wOther to define the “true” relative 
value of each proposal, which allows us to estimate the proportion of observed G and S 
choices for each subject that might reasonably be assumed to be errors. This analysis 
suggests that G choices were significantly more likely to be errors (M = 49% ± 38%) than S 
choices (M = 10% ± 21%, paired-t50 = 5.45, P < .0001).
We carry out a further test of this prediction, using outcome period BOLD responses, based 
on the following logic. The model suggests that a proposal’s true value should become 
increasingly clear to the decision circuitry as the amount of accumulated evidence increases 
over time, because random fluctuations in the signal will tend to cancel out. If subjects 
continue to accumulate evidence about the proposal even after making a choice (i.e., 
Hutcherson et al. Page 8
Neuron. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 July 16.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
“double-checking” whether they have made an error), then these signals should be quite 
clean by the time the subject sees the outcome of his choice. If this increased clarity leads a 
subject to realize at some point after making his choice that it was a mistake, having that 
mistake overturned during the outcome period (yielding the unchosen but ultimately 
preferred option) should be perceived as “good news” (i.e. relief), whereas having it 
implemented should be experienced as “bad news” (i.e. disappointment). If the original 
choice is actually correct, then reversal of this choice should be perceived negatively. The 
model thus predicts that reversal of S choices (which simulations suggest are generally likely 
to be correct) should be associated with negative affect and lower response in brain regions 
coding for the utility of an outcome, relative to non-reversal. In contrast, because G choices 
more likely reflect choice errors, reversing them should be more likely to evoke positive 
affect and greater neural response compared to implementation. Finally, the response in 
utility-coding areas to reversing a G choice should increase, across subjects, with the model-
estimated likelihood that G choices are mistakes.
We tested these predictions by computing the difference between response in the vmPFC to 
reversal vs. implementation of G or S choices, controlling both for the strength of preference 
at the time of decision, and for actual outcomes received (i.e. the amounts $Self and $Other 
resulting from choice combined with the random implementation, see GLM 1 in Methods 
for details). Consistent with predictions, vmPFC response to reversal vs. implementation 
was significantly higher after G compared to S choices (P = .02, SVC, Figure 7A). Also as 
predicted by the model, the difference in response in this region correlated positively with 
the estimated excess rate of mistakes for G over S choices (r39 = .43, P = .004, Figure 7B).
 Discussion
We have proposed a neurocomputational model of altruistic choice that builds on behavioral, 
neural and computational work in non-social domains (Basten et al., 2010; Bogacz et al., 
2010; Hare et al., 2011; Heekeren et al., 2008; Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008). In the model, 
decisions result from the stochastic accumulation of a relative value signal that linearly 
weights information about payoffs for self and other. Despite its simplicity, the model has 
considerable explanatory power. It accounts for differences in average levels of altruism and 
RTs within and across subjects, as well as for neural signals encoded in vmPFC, TPJ and 
striatum at the time of choice. Our results provide insight into the common processes at 
work in altruistic choice and simple non-social decisions, shed light on some of the neural 
mechanisms specifically involved in the computation of social value, and provide novel 
insights into the nature of altruistic behavior.
 Simple vs. social decision-making
A growing body of work suggests that in simple non-social choices the vmPFC receives 
information from regions computing information about different stimulus attributes (Basten 
et al., 2010; Hare et al., 2009; Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Lim et al., 2013), and combines it 
into a relative value signal (Hare et al., 2009; Kable and Glimcher, 2007). This signal is then 
dynamically integrated in comparator regions using algorithms with properties similar to the 
DDM (Basten et al., 2010; Hare et al., 2011; Hunt et al., 2012). BOLD responses in our 
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study suggest a similar neural architecture for social choice: we observed attribute-coding 
regions like the striatum and TPJ (which correlated with $Self and $Other, respectively), as 
well as a vmPFC region that represented $Self and $Other simultaneously and encoded the 
overall value of a choice.
 Neural and psychological bases of pro-social decision-making
Although several studies have shown that the TPJ plays a role in empathic and altruistic 
decision-making (Decety and Jackson, 2006; Hare et al., 2010; Morishima et al., 2012; Saxe 
and Powell, 2006) its precise computational nature remains poorly understood. Our findings 
show that, at least during altruistic choice, signals in this area may reflect computations 
related to others’ interests. This signal differs from two popular alternative accounts of TPJ 
function: that it represents the beliefs of others (Saxe and Powell, 2006) or that it allows 
attention to be shifted away from the self (Scholz et al., 2009). Neither theory appears to 
fully explain the pattern of TPJ response in our task. Although computations about belief 
might be used to determine how another person would value the proposal, it is not clear why 
this representation would appear selectively for higher rather than lower amounts of $Other. 
Similarly, if attentional shifts help to incorporate others’ rewards into the value signal, they 
should be equally important for both gains and losses (relative to the default). This predicts a 
correlation with the absolute value of $Other vs. the default, rather than the positive linear 
response observed here. Tasks observing belief representation or attentional reorienting in 
TPJ typically examine these processes in an evaluation-free context. We speculate that the 
explicit use of attention or belief representations to construct value representations may 
produce the pattern of results here. Future work will be needed to determine whether such 
differences can help to integrate the current findings with previous literature.
The specific processes tapped by our task may also explain why we do not find other areas 
often implicated in prosociality, such as the anterior insula. While this region contributes to a 
variety of cognitive and affective functions (Kurth et al., 2010), studies implicating insula in 
social decision-making typically involve a strong component of negative affect, such as the 
pain and suffering of a victim (Singer, 2006; Singer et al., 2004). These considerations may 
play a more limited role in our task, which likely involves more abstract representation of 
costs and benefits. Exploring how different task features influence the specific neural and 
psychological processes deployed during altruistic decisions represents an important avenue 
for research.
 Model implications
Several implications of the model showcase the value of computational approaches, and 
provide novel insights into the nature of pro-social behavior. First, consistent with the data, 
model simulations predict that generous decisions are made more slowly, but that this 
slowdown is less pronounced in more generous subjects. This observation has direct 
relevance for a literature that has made the case for dual-process models of social decision-
making based on RT differences between generous and selfish choices (Piovesan and 
Wengstrom, 2009; Rand et al., 2012; Tinghog et al., 2013). Our results suggest caution in 
interpreting these RT differences, by showing how they can arise without requiring 
competition between “fast and automatic” and “slow and deliberative” systems. In our 
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model, generous choices are made more slowly if the relative weight placed on the self is 
higher, but more quickly if weights on others’ payoffs are higher.
This could help to reconcile some of the apparently contradictory results in this literature. 
Different contexts can evoke dramatically different levels of altruistic or pro-social behavior 
(Engel, 2011). Studies observing faster RTs for more generous or cooperative choices (Rand 
et al., 2012) may establish contexts in which, for a variety of reasons, the needs of others are 
weighted more highly, while studies observing slower RTs (Piovesan and Wengstrom, 2009) 
may prime subjects toward reduced consideration of others. Note, however, that our results 
do not undermine the general validity of dual-process frameworks. Indeed, in some respects, 
our model can be interpreted as involving dual processes with respect to valuing self- and 
other-interests, but suggests that RT data should be used carefully and in conjunction with 
more formal computational models to derive and test predictions.
Second, the model has similar implications for the interpretation of neural response. It 
predicts that for subjects with a bias toward the self (i.e., almost everyone), brain areas 
whose activity scales with computations in the accumulation and comparison process will 
have greater response on trials resulting in generous choice. We find this pattern in both the 
TPJ and vmPFC, and show that it can be accounted for by the neurocomputational model. 
These results urge caution in interpreting generosity-specific activation in TPJ as inhibition 
of selfish impulses (Strombach et al., 2015), or in concluding from activation differences in 
vmPFC that choosing generously is rewarding (Strombach et al., 2015; Zaki and Mitchell, 
2011). A simple neurocomputational model with identical parameters on every trial 
reproduces these differences without requiring that choosing generously specifically involve 
either self-control or a special reward value.
A third implication of the model concerns the relationship between individual differences in 
generosity and specific model parameters. Not surprisingly, generosity increases with the 
weight to other and decreases with the weight to self. More surprisingly, generosity also 
increases with less stringent barriers (i.e., lower starting threshold and a faster collapse rate). 
Thus, systematic differences in altruistic behavior may not reflect different underlying 
preferences (i.e. weights on self and other), but simply alterations in the amount of noise in 
the decision process. This observation has important implications for the large body of social 
decision-making literature that has used manipulations that might influence barrier height 
and response caution, such as time pressure (Rand et al., 2012), cognitive load (Cornelissen 
et al., 2011), or even electrical brain stimulation (Ruff et al., 2013). The results of these 
studies are often assumed to support a role of self-control in increasing (or decreasing) 
consideration of others’ welfare. Our results point to an alternative interpretation, and 
suggest that greater attention should be paid to the precise mechanism of action through 
which different manipulations influence generosity.
The observation that noise can induce systematic shifts in choice without systematic shifts in 
preferences leads to the final implication of our model: that a significant fraction of generous 
choices may be decision mistakes. Results from the outcome period in our study suggest that 
people track these errors, and may feel relieved when the consequences of such errors are 
avoided due to external contingencies. This insight has profound implications for our 
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understanding of both basic decision-making and pro-sociality. It adds to other work on 
impure altruism (Andreoni, 1990; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009), suggesting that any single 
generous act can result from many processes that have little to do with the true value we 
assign to others’ welfare.
 Experimental Procedures
 Participants
Male volunteers (N = 122) were recruited in pairs from the Caltech community. Half were 
active participants who completed the scanning task. The other subjects participated 
passively as described below. All were right-handed, healthy, had normal/corrected-to-
normal vision, were free of psychiatric/neurological conditions, and did not report taking 
any medications that might interfere with fMRI. All participants received a show-up fee of 
$30 as well as $0-$100 in additional earnings, depending on the outcome of a randomly 
chosen experimental trial. We excluded data from ten scanning subjects due to excessive 
head motion or technical difficulties during scanning (remaining 51 subjects: 18–35 years of 
age, mean 22.3). Caltech’s Internal Review Board approved all procedures. Subjects 
provided informed consent prior to participation.
 Task
Each participant in a pair arrived separately to the lab and waited in a private area where he 
received instructions. We randomly designated one participant as the active participant (AP), 
who completed the tasks described below. We designated the other as the passive partner 
(PP) who, after receiving instructions, waited in a separate room for the study duration. The 
PP’s presence created a real and non-deceptive social context for the AP.
The AP made 180 real decisions in a modified Dictator Game. On each trial he chose 
between a proposed pair of monetary prizes to himself and his partner and a constant default 
prize-pair of $50 to both (Figure 1A). Proposed prizes varied from $10 to $100 and were 
drawn from one of the nine pairs shown in Figure 1B. Each pair appeared 20 times, 
randomly intermixed across trials, and divided evenly across four scanner runs (5 instances/
run). To minimize habituation and repetition effects, proposal amounts were randomly 
jittered by $1–$4, with the exception that amounts above $100 were always jittered 
downwards. The side of the screen on which $Self appeared was counterbalanced across 
subjects but was constant throughout the task.
All prize-pairs included one payment below and one payment above the default, and thus 
involved a choice between generous behavior (benefitting the other at a cost to oneself) and 
selfish behavior (benefitting oneself at a cost to the other). After presentation of the 
proposal, subjects had up to four seconds to indicate their choice using a 4-point scale 
(Strong No, No, Yes, Strong Yes). This allowed us to simultaneously measure both their 
decision and the relative value of the proposed payment at the time of choice. The direction 
of increasing preference (right-to-left or left-to-right) varied on each scan. If the subject 
failed to respond within 4 s, both individuals received $0 for that trial. Although this time 
limit could be considered a form of time pressure, pilot testing with free response times 
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suggested that a relative minority of choices (14%) took longer than four seconds and that 
other basic properties of choice and RT were similar to the current study.
The task also included a second component designed both to increase the anonymity of 
choices and allow us to test a prediction made by the DDM about the possibility of decision 
mistakes. After a random delay of 2–4 s following response, the subject’s choice was 
implemented probabilistically: in 60% of trials he received his chosen option, while in 40% 
his choice was reversed and he received the alternative non-chosen option. This reversal 
meant that while it was always in his best interest to choose according to his true 
preferences, his partner could never be sure about the actual choice made. APs were 
informed that the PPs were aware of the probabilistic implementation. The 40% reversal rate 
was necessary to test key predictions of the model, but raises the concern that it alters 
decision computations. Pilot testing with only 10% choice reversals yielded nearly identical 
behavioral results, suggesting this is not likely an issue.
 Behavioral definition of generosity
We label specific decisions as Generous (G) if the AP gave up money to help the PP (i.e., 
accepting $Self < $50 or rejecting $Self > $50), and as Selfish (S) otherwise. Subject-level 
generosity was measured by the average amount of money per trial that a subject gave to the 
PP by choosing generously. Alternative measures of generosity (such as money sacrificed) 
led to similar results.
 Model estimation
We use maximum likelihood to estimate the value of the free parameters that provide the 
best fit to the observed choice and RT data, separately for each AP. For assessing the 
goodness-of-fit of the model, we estimate these parameters separately for half of the trials 
and test the accuracy of predictions in the other half of the data. For testing model 
implications, we use the full set of trials for each AP to fit the parameters. Fitting was done 
in several steps.
First, we ran 1000 simulations of the DDM to compute the likelihood function over observed 
choices (Yes/No) and RT bins separately for each proposal-pair used in the experiment and 
each possible combination of parameters. RT bins were specified in 250-ms increments from 
0 to 4 s, and included one additional bin for non-responses (simulations in which the RDV 
failed to cross a barrier within the 4-sec time limit). The combination of parameters used 
covers a grid determined by the cross-product of the following sets: wSelf = wOther = [−.045, 
−.003, −.0015, 0, .0015, .0003, .0045, .006, .0075, .009, .0105, .012, .0135], NDT = [.3, .5, .
7, .9, 1.1, 1.3], B = [.04, .06, .08, .1, .12, .14, .16, .18, .2, .22, .24, .26, .28, .3, .32] and b = 
[0, .00005, .0001, .00025, .0005, .00075, .001, .005]. The range of the grid was chosen by 
trial-and-error so that no more than 10% of subjects fell on a boundary edge for any 
parameter, while keeping the total number of parameter combinations low to minimize 
exploding computational costs.
Second, for each subject we identified the parameter combination that minimized the 
negative log-likelihood (NLL) of the selected trials observed for that subject, based on 
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likelihoods generated from the simulated data. If more than one parameter combination 
resulted in the same minimal NLL, one was randomly selected as the solution.
 Model simulations—To assess model fits to behavior, we used half of each subject’s 
responses (randomly selected) to find the best-fitting parameters, and simulated 1000 runs of 
the other half of trials seen by that individual. We then compared observed and simulated 
values for the average amount given to the partner, average RT on G and S choice trials, and 
average choices and RTs for particular proposals.
We also simulated data from the best-fitting parameters for all trials in each subject, to 
explore other model implications. First, we predicted overall response in the accumulator 
(Implication 2 and Figure 6). We speculated based on prior research (Basten et al., 2010) 
that several brain regions may contribute to this computation, and explored the implications 
of this architecture for understanding behavioral and neural correlates of generosity. We 
follow Basten et al. (2010) in defining accumulator response for each trial as Σt |RDVt|, and 
estimate it separately for G and S choices (see GLM 3 below). Second, we explored how 
individual variation in model parameters affects generosity (Implication 3). Finally, we used 
simulations to understand the role of choice errors in producing altruistic behavior 
(Implication 4 and Figure 7).
 fMRI
fMRI data was acquired and preprocessed using standard procedures (see Supplemental 
Experimental Procedures for details). Using this data we estimated three different general 
linear models (GLMs) of BOLD response.
 GLM 1—The first GLM served two purposes: 1) to identify regions associated with the 
overall decision value of the proposal behaviorally expressed at the time of choice; and 2) to 
test the hypothesis that many generous choices should be considered errors, and thus be 
perceived as good news if they are reversed.
For each subject we estimated a GLM with AR(1) and the following regressors of interest: 
R1) A boxcar function for the choice period on all trials; R2) R1 modulated by the 
behaviorally expressed preference, ranging from 1 = Strong No to 4 = Strong Yes; R3) a 
boxcar function of 3 s duration for the outcome period; R4) R3 modulated by the outcome 
for self on each trial; R5) R3 modulated by the outcome for other on each trial; R6) R3 
modulated by a variable consisting of a 1 for every trial in which the subject chose 
generously but the choice was vetoed, a −1 for every trial in which the subject chose 
generously and the choice was implemented, and 0 otherwise (i.e. after a selfish choice); R7) 
R3 modulated by a variable similar to R6, but which was 1 for veto of selfish choices, −1 for 
implementation of selfish choices, and 0 otherwise. No orthogonalization was used, allowing 
regressors to compete fully for explained variance. All regressors of interest were convolved 
with the canonical form of the hemodynamic response. The model also included motion 
parameters and session constants as regressors of no interest. Missed response trials were 
excluded from analysis.
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We then computed second-level random effects contrasts with one-sample t-tests, using the 
single-subject parameter estimates to construct several contrasts. We used R2 to determine 
areas correlated with behaviorally expressed preference at the time of choice. We used R6 
and R7, and their difference, to explore activation related to choice reversal. Because 
outcomes for self and other are entered as modulators, R6 and R7 reflect differences in 
response over and above those associated purely with the amounts received when the 
outcome is revealed.
For inference purposes, we imposed a family-wise error cluster-corrected threshold of P < .
05 (based on Gaussian random field theory as implemented in SPM5). We also report results 
surviving small-volume correction within regions for which we had strong a priori 
hypotheses (see ROI definition below), including vmPFC and TPJ.
 GLM 2—This GLM identified regions in which activity correlates with proposed 
payments at the time of choice. It included the following regressors: R1) A boxcar function 
for the choice period on all trials; R2) R1 modulated by $Self on each trial; R3) R1 
modulated by $Other on each trial; R4) a 3 s boxcar function for the outcome period; R5) R4 
modulated by the outcome for self on each trial; R6) R4 modulated by the outcome for other 
on each trial. All other details are as in GLM 1. Using GLM 2, we calculated three single-
subject parametric contrasts: R2 vs. zero, R3 vs zero, and R2 vs R3.
 GLM 3—We used GLM 3 to test predictions about comparator differences on G vs. S 
choice trials. It included the following regressors: R1) A boxcar function for the choice 
period on trials when the subject chose selfishly; R2) R1 modulated by the behaviorally 
expressed preference at the time of choice; R3) A boxcar function for the choice period on 
trials when the subject chose generously; R4) R3 modulated by behavioral preference. R5-9 
were identical to R3-7 from GLM 1. The contrast R3 vs. R1 identified regions with 
differential response for G vs. to S choices.
Within two independently-defined ROIs in vmPFC and TPJ (see Figure 5), we calculated the 
average value of the contrast R3 – R1 for each subject, and regressed it on the model-
predicted difference in accumulator activity (BOLDG – S = β0 + β1*DDMG – S). This allowed 
us to determine if predicted accumulator differences were associated with BOLD differences 
on G vs. S choice trials, and whether differential generosity-related BOLD response (i.e., β0) 
remained significant after controlling for predicted accumulator differences.
 ROI Definition—For use in small-volume corrections, as implemented in SPM5, we 
defined three a priori regions-of-interest: a vmPFC region associated with decision value, a 
vmPFC region associated outcome value, and bilateral TPJ. We defined decision-value 
related vmPFC using the conjunction of two recent meta-analyses on decision-related reward 
valuation (Bartra et al., 2013; Clithero and Rangel, 2013). Outcome-value related vmPFC 
was defined in a similar way, but based on meta-analysis results for value representations at 
outcome, which may preferentially activate more anterior vmPFC regions (Clithero and 
Rangel, 2013). The TPJ mask was defined anatomically using the WFU PickAtlas (http://
fmri.wfubmc.edu/software/PickAtlas), with a dilation of 3mm to ensure full coverage of the 
area. It included bilateral angular and superior temporal gyrus, posterior to y = −40 (1975 
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voxels), a region encompassing activation peaks from several studies of Theory-of-Mind 
(Decety and Jackson, 2006; Saxe and Powell, 2006). All masks can be obtained from http://
www.rnl.caltech.edu/resources/index.html.
 Supplementary Material
Refer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.
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Figure 1. 
Task design and model. A) The task consisted of a decision phase, in which subjects chose 
whether to accept the proposed payment-pair or a default of $50 to both individuals, and a 
subsequent outcome phase, in which subjects discovered if their choices had been 
implemented (60% of trials), or reversed, resulting in the non-chosen option (40% of trials). 
B) Proposed transfers used in the experiment describing $Self and $Other. The alternative 
was always a transfer of $50 to both subjects. X- and Y-axes represent distance from default 
offer. The filled area in each transfer is proportional to the percentage of pro-social choices 
across all subjects. C) In the DDM model, choices are made through the noisy accumulation 
of a relative value signal (RDV), based on a weighted sum of the amounts $Self and $Other 
available on each trial. A response occurs when this accumulated value signal crosses a 
threshold, with an RT equal to the total accumulated time + a non-decision time (NDT) to 
account for sensory and motor-related processes unrelated to the comparison process itself.
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Figure 2. 
Model fits to behavior. A) Model-predicted vs. observed average generosity across subjects. 
Dashed 45 degree line represents a perfect match. B) Model-predicted vs. observed overall 
response time (RT). C) Within-subject acceptance likelihood (mean ± SEM) and D) RT 
(mean ± SEM) for each of the 9 proposal-types. Observed behavior: grey bars. Predict 
behavior: blue circles.
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Figure 3. 
Neural responses vary parametrically with A) behavioral preference at the time of choice; B) 
$Self on each trial; and C) $Other on each trial. D) Conjunction of $Self and $Other in 
vmPFC. Bar plot (mean ± SEM) shown for illustrative purposes only. Activations displayed 
at P < .001, uncorrected.
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Figure 4. 
Model implications for RT differences. A) At the fitted parameters, the model predicts 
generous (G) choices should take longer than selfish (S) choices. B) The model predicts that 
overall generosity correlates negatively with RT differences on G vs. S choices. C) Observed 
RTs for G and S choices. D) Observed relationship between average generosity and G vs. S 
choice RT differences. Bars show mean RT ± SEM. ** P < .001
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Figure 5. 
Model implications for BOLD response (mean ± SEM) during generous (G) vs. selfish (S) 
choices. Independently defined regions in value-related vmPFC (A) and generosity-related 
TPJ (B) both show higher response on G choice trials. B) Individual variation in G vs. S 
choice BOLD response is accounted for by model-predicted comparator differences in both 
regions. *P=.02; **P=.008.
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Figure 6. 
Model implications for relation between different parameters of the model and behavior. A) 
Variation in generosity as weights for self and other vary, and B) as threshold starting height 
and collapse rate vary. C) Variation in likelihood that a generous choice is a mistake as a 
function of weights for self and other and D) threshold parameters. Dots represent the 
estimated parameter values for the 51 subjects who completed the fMRI study, jittered 
randomly by a small amount to allow visualization of subjects with overlapping values.
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Figure 7. 
Model implications for the likelihood that selfish (S) or generous (G) choices are errors. A) 
A vmPFC region implicated in coding outcome value responded more positively to reversal 
vs. receipt of G choices compared to S choices (P <. 05, SVC). Differential BOLD response 
in this region (mean ± SEM) is shown for illustrative purposes only. B) vmPFC response to 
reversal vs. receipt of G vs. S choices correlated with the DDM-predicted likelihood that a 
subject’s G choices were more likely to be errors than S choices (i.e. indexing the relief they 
should feel if those choices are overturned).
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Table 1
Parameters of the best-fitting DDM for each subject. wSelf and wOther represent weights applied to the value of 
$Self and $Other on each trial compared to the default. NDT: non-decision time. b and d: starting value and 
collapse rate of the decision threshold.
Parameter Mean SD Min Max
wSelf .006 .002 0 .0105
wOther .001 .0026 −.003 .009
NDT 868ms 241ms 300ms 1,300ms
b .23 .065 .08 .32
d .00046 .00022 0 .001
Neuron. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 July 16.
